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Abstract This paper has the aim of contributing to the existing research by analysing
two particular topics. First of all, we show that the model specifications by Alesina
et al. (J Econ Growth 8:155–194, 2003), which connects high ethnic fractionalisation
to lower growth via bad policy variables, cannot fully explain the negative ethnic frac-
tionalisation effect of the 1990s Sub-Saharan African growth experience. Moreover,
we show that the remaining negative effect of ethnic fractionalisation on growth in
Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s is due to an increased importance of adverse gov-
ernance. Second, and on a very different note, we empirically investigate if ethnic
fractionalisation might have a positive effect in a nation which is ethnically diverse
due to immigration. There is evidence that it is important to distinguish between these
two different kinds of ethnic fractionalisation.
Keywords Growth · Ethnic fractionalisation · Migration · Cross-country regression
1 Introduction
A wide range of studies have found robust evidence for the negative effect of high
ethnic fractionalisation on long-run growth in a cross section of countries. This growth-
diminishing effect of ethnic fractionalisation has been found to be operating through an
adverse policy environment and the suboptimal provision of public goods (Easterly and
Levine 1997; Easterly 2001a,b; Alesina et al. 2003). However, the channels through
which ethnic fractionalisation has an impact on growth have been analysed only
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partially by these studies. Furthermore, the impact of ethnic fractionalisation on eco-
nomic progress might be far more complex than the existing empirical studies would
suggest. For this reason this paper intends to extend the existing analyses.
First of all, it seems reasonable and desirable to update the data set used by Alesina
et al. (2003) into the 1990s to analyse the robustness of their results in a wider time
range. Interestingly, we find a prevailing negative direct effect of ethnic fraction-
alisation on growth after the inclusion of the 1990s, despite the inclusion of policy
control variables. Hence, we apply decade- and region-specific regressions, as well as
a region-specific ethnic fractionalisation interaction term, in order to identify whether
this result is driven by decade- or region-specific effects. We find that the growth-
hampering impact of ethnic fractionalisation remains only in the 1990s and in Sub-
Saharan Africa once the policy framework of Alesina et al. (2003) is controlled for.
Moreover, we show that this 1990s effect vanishes if we implement the Kaufman–
Kraay–Zoido-Lobaton-indicator of governance in the existing model framework of
Alesina et al. The specific Sub-Saharan effect of fractionalisation, instead, shows an
indirect effect via public investment on growth and not via governance per se. In
line with recent research on violent conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005), we
cannot confirm the hypothesis that the remaining negative impact of ethnic fraction-
alisation is due to violent conflicts. Thus, our results indicate that the original model
specification by Alesina et al. (2003), which connects high ethnic fractionalisation
to lower growth via bad policy variables, cannot fully explain the negative ethnic
fractionalisation effect of the 1990s Sub-Saharan African growth experience.
In addition, it might be the case that the alleged negative effect of ethnic fractionali-
sation on growth, described above, is possibly mitigated by positive effects prevailing
in multi-ethnic societies. In particular, there is a large body of literature which suggests
that the existence of co-ethnic networks has a large positive impact on trade and, thus,
on growth. The theoretical argument is that immigrants have an informational and trust
advantage in arranging trade with their home countries over their local counterparts
(Epstein and Gang 2000; Casella and Rauch 1997; Rauch 2001). Co-ethnic networks
are also found to promote foreign direct investment (Tong 2005). Hence, we empiri-
cally investigate whether ethnic fractionalisation might be a positive factor in a nation
which is ethnically diverse partially due to past immigration.1 We find some indication
that countries which are ethnically diverse due to past immigration can mitigate the
negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth. We are the first, to our knowl-
edge, to distinguish between these two different kinds of ethnic fractionalisation in
order to determine whether the result empirically indicates this multi-dimensionality
of ethnic diversity. We find the positive effect, but we cannot confirm the trade and
foreign direct investment hypothesis.
This paper is structured as follows: Sects. 2 and 3 will focus on the existing theo-
retical consideration and empirical research which has been produced so far. This is
followed by a brief discussion of our data and methodology in Sect. 4. Then we shall
1 More specifically, we classify a country as an immigration country if it was characterised by settlement
from a non-neighbouring country, forced or free, within the past 300 years and the descendants of foreign
settlers constitute a significant part (at least 5%) of the population today.
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present and discuss our results in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6 we identify potentially interesting
future research questions and conclude.
2 Theoretical framework
There are two different strands of literature, one of which suggests that ethnic diversity
is harmful to growth and another which suggests the opposite.
Zak and Knack (2001), for instance, argue that high ethnic diversity increases the
social distance between groups, which in turn reduces the amount of trust in a society.
Due to the significant information and enforcement problems in many (particularly
risky) economic transactions, lack of trust will reduce the amount of beneficial eco-
nomic transactions, increase transaction costs on monitoring and enforcement and
will make some contracts impossible. A related insight emerges from the literature
on ’social capital’ which measures the number and intensity of social interactions and
linkages between members of a society and has found that social capital is potentially
conducive to economic development because it favours cooperation and reduces prob-
lems due to asymmetric information. The theoretical argument is that social capital is
harder to establish between divided ethnic groups in a society.2
Furthermore, some authors argue that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of
conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) model the likelihood of a civil war as a cost-
benefit calculation of potential rebels. While ethnic diversity is likely to increase the
incentive to incite rebellion due to grievances (perceived and actual) experienced by
individual ethnic groups, having very large numbers of ethnic groups might make the
coordination of a successful rebellion difficult. Thus, Collier and Hoeffler argue that
civil wars are particularly likely in ethnically polarised societies, where a few ethnic
groups vie for political control.
However, not only violent, but also political conflict has been hypothesised as a
channel through which high ethnic diversity negatively influences economic growth.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) suggest that groups may attempt to shift the burden of eco-
nomic stabilisation and reform onto other groups when stabilisation has significant
distributional implications. Even though it is agreed that stabilisation requires cuts in
public expenditure to eliminate the budget deficit, the distribution of the allocation of
the costs is not agreed upon. The process leading to stabilisation can therefore often be
described as a war of attrition, which delays stabilisation and only ends when certain
groups allow the others to decide on the allocation of the burden of the fiscal adjustment.
More politically polarised countries will experience longer periods of instability. In the
case that different ethnic groups are also strongly politically polarised then the model
also applies in the context of ethnic diversity. Similar arguments are made by Easterly
and Levine (1997), who argue that high ethnic diversity leads to poor policy choices.
Governments either find it difficult to agree on painful economic reforms, attempt to
shift the burden to other groups, or simply try to enrich themselves as they fear that their
2 However, the theoretical literature on social capital also suggests that social capital slows down the tran-
sition process of development between one stage and the next and is, therefore, bad for economic growth.
See Banerjee and Newman (1998), Arnott and Stiglitz (1991).
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tenure might be limited due to the strong resistance of other ethnic groups. Svensson
(1998) develops a game-theoretic, rent-seeking model in which groups compete for
common-pool resources. Even in a repeated interaction game cooperation might not
be enforceable and the groups sustain their costly appropriation efforts.
In general, political regimes in ethnically diverse countries are often found to be
more engaged in inefficient “identity politics” than in more efficient “performance
politics”. In the former situation, a political regime or party is supported not for
its performance in terms of furthering prosperity, but for being led by people from
the same group, while in the latter situation economic and political performance is
rewarded. As most ethnically diverse countries are diverse at the national level and
relatively homogeneous at the regional level, “identity politics” persist at the national
level. With these politics people are reminded of differences and therefore an environ-
ment of low trust and cooperation is built and maintained. Collier (1998) argues that
loyalty to ethnically based parties is often maintained irrespective of economic per-
formance and the government delivers patronage to the loyalists rather than services
to the median voter.
A further disadvantage of high ethnic diversity is that it is believed to reduce the
provision of public goods. Alesina et al. (1999) formulate a model which links the
heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a city to the amount and type of
public goods the city supplies. A jurisdiction with two or more polarised groups (in the
sense that these groups have preferences very far away from the median) would prefer
to keep taxes low and deduct resources from the public good to private consumption.
This results in a suboptimal provision of the public good which is then to the detriment
of all.3
These theories may all lead to vicious cycles of high ethnic diversity, poor economic
performance and greater ethnic identification as a result since marginalised groups will
build up even stronger identities in the face of poor economic performance and their
social exclusion (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
On the positive side, Lazear (1999) was one of the firsts to show that diversity
can increase productivity. This effect arises because workers with different cultural
backgrounds and skills are complementary. There is, however, a trade-off between
the productive benefits of diversity and costs that occur due to possible difficulties
in communication. Alesina and Ferrara (2004) highlighted that the benefits of skill
differentiation are more likely to be higher in more advanced and complex societies.
Furthermore, ethnic or linguistic diversity which is due to immigration may improve
trade opportunities for a country. Immigrants form ethnic networks between their home
and host country (Casella and Rauch 1997). Girma and Yu (2000) provide evidence
that the trade-immigration linkage is driven by the new information brought by immi-
grants about their home country and not so much by existing business connections
and personal contacts with their home country. This would mean that ethnic networks
enhance trade between dissimilar countries. Gould (1994) describes the positive effect
ofco-ethnic networks as immigrants having links to their home country, which is like
3 It should be noted that other forms of social distance, such as high income inequality or a geographical
segregation of groups that could be unrelated to ethnic diversity, could also deliver such a result.
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a human-capital externality that enhances trade opportunities (most likely between
developed and developing countries). Trade is enhanced by a decrease in transaction
costs to trade. Furthermore, bilateral trade flows are positively affected by the pref-
erence of immigrants for home country products. Gould (1994) finds that the trade
enhancing effect is the strongest in the export sector and only a relatively small com-
munity of immigrants is needed to exhaust this effect. A relatively large community,
however, is needed to exhaust the positive trade effect in the import sector. Under
world-wide free-trade regime countries may, however, enjoy the benefits of homoge-
neity and the diversity of production through international trade. Therefore, Alesina
et al. (2000) argued that countries would prefer to be more homogenous in this case.
Similarly, ethnic diversity of a country increases the attractiveness of that country
to immigrants who often migrate to countries with existing networks of immigrants of
the same origin. This increases the efficiency and adaptability of the labour market to
economic change, and to the extent that the skills of the immigrants complement the
home country population, is likely to improve the growth performance of that country.
Last, ethnic diversity might be seen as beneficial, because it increases the variety of
products on offer in a country. As much of trade between rich countries is driven by
such a taste for variety, there would logically be considerable benefit if such variety
could be provided within one’s own borders.
This paper aims to investigate the respective merits of the two theories on ethnic
diversity in an empirical analysis to enhance our understanding of the possible multi-
dimensionality of ethnic diversity with respect to economic growth. Many of the
potential gains from diversity may be more pronounced in high-immigration coun-
tries, which might be in a particularly strong position to reap the possible benefits of
ethnic diversity mentioned above. Moreover, countries with a long-standing immigra-
tion history are more likely willing to introduce institutions that mitigate the negative
effects of diversity and manage to dissolve political battles over scarce resources more
effectively, whilst simultaneously harnessing the potential benefits of complementary
skills and co-ethnic trading networks. Hence, we hypothesis that there is possibly a
different relationship between ethnic diversity and growth in countries with a long
history of immigration.
3 Existing empirical investigations
The pioneering paper by Easterly and Levine (1997), as well as a follow-up study by
Alesina et al. (2003) argue that ethnic conflicts in the political sphere reduce economic
growth by leading governments to adopt inefficient economic policies and low pub-
lic good provision. Using cross-country seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) the
authors show that the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation operates via certain
policy variables on growth. This link between ethnic diversity and the individual policy
variable is further analysed by separate regressions which link ethnic fractionalisation
significantly to the quality of policy and institutions. These identified channels have
hurt Sub-Saharan Africa particularly, which had the highest measured fractionalisation
and in turn had the lowest economic growth in the period of 1960–1990. For instance,
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the negative coefficient of the ethnic variable of −0.0194 implies that Uganda has
1.77% points lower annual growth in per capita income in the base line specification
than South Korea which is merely due to different degrees of ethnic fractionalisation
−0.002 in South Korea versus 0.93 in Uganda.
As noted in the previous section, other forms of social distance, especially income
inequality could also lead to polarisation of interests between groups and therefore have
identical implications for the economic performance in a country. Easterly (2001a,b)
shows indeed that societies with a low class and income divide grow the fastest and
the channels through which high ethnic diversity and high inequality have an impact
on growth happen to be the same.
Moreover, extensions by Easterly (2001a,b) show that the negative impact of high
ethnic fractionalisation can be mitigated by strong institutions which they measure
using the data from the International Country Risk Guide. These indicators mea-
sure the strength of the rule of law, judicial independence, bureaucratic quality and
protection of property rights. In countries with such strong institutions, the negative
effect of ethnic fractionalisation on economic growth can be largely avoided (Easterly
2001a,b).
Ottaviano and Peri (2005), as well as Sparber (2007), find evidence that eth-
nic diversity boosts productivity. Using a panel model Ottaviano and Peri (2005)
show that linguistic diversity increases wages of white U.S. born males that are
40–50 years old.
No empirical study has considered the relationship between migration and ethnic
fractionalisation in a cross country setting so far. Several empirical studies find that
immigrant links play an important role in determining bilateral trade flows. Gould
(1994) shows that immigrants’ ties to their home country play a key role in explaining
bilateral trade flows of the U.S. Girma and Yu (2000) investigate the link between
immigration and trade using U.K. data. They find evidence that immigration from
non-Commonwealth countries has a significant trade enhancing effect. Both studies
find a pro-import, but most importantly pro-export effect. Frankel and Romer (1999)
find that trade has a robust and quantitatively large impact on income when controlling
for the direction of causality.
Using a gravity model,Tong (2005) finds that Chinese networks, measured as the
number of Chinese people in the country, are important correlate of bilateral for-
eign direct investment. She further investigates the mechanisms through which this
co-ethnic network has an effect on cross-border investment. She finds that commu-
nity enforcement of sanctions is important in countries with low bureaucratic qual-
ity. Furthermore, Chinese networks provide assistance in overcoming informational
barriers.
4 Data and methodology
Since our first objective was to update and extend the analysis of Alesina et al., we
used the same variables and extended the dataset where possible using the same data
4 See Table 2.
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Table 1 Sample means of
fractionalisation indices by
region
Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
Note: ELF is Ethno-Linguistic
Fractionalisation, constructed by
Easterly and Levine (1997) using
the Russian Atlas Narodov Mira
ELF Ethnic Language Religion
Latin America & Carribean 0.265 0.405 0.179 0.442
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.651 0.658 0.652 0.496
Eastern & Central Europe 0.315 0.366 0.32 0.491
Western & Southern Europe 0.147 0.177 0.196 0.311
Middle East 0.244 0.453 0.33 0.346
East & South East Asia 0.306 0.353 0.457 0.462
sources to include the 1990s. This was possible for all variables except telephones
per 1,000 workers instead of which we introduced the variable telephones per 1,000
people.5 We decided to focus our research on the ethnic fractionalisation variable
“ethnic” only, which was constructed by Alesina et al. (2003). This is mainly due to
the fact that we deemed it to be the most reasonable measure of ethnic fractionalisation
available to date.
The variable “ethnic” is measured by a one minus a Herfindahl concentration index
Fract j = 1 −
N∑
i=1
si j 2 (1)
where s is the share of group i (i = 1, . . . , N ) in country j . The index takes values
from zero to one for each country. In practical terms, this index measures the prob-
ability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to a different ethnic group. The
data to construct this index, i.e. the values for the group shares, are mainly taken from
the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2001). A separate ethnic group is defined if there exist
distinguishing linguistic and/or ethnic characteristics.
Table 1 shows the average fractionalisation measures of the different indices for
the different regions of the world. Note that Sub-Saharan Africa displays the highest
average index for all measures of fractionalisation. The index “ethnic” gives a more
realistic picture of fractionalisation in Latin America than the ethno-linguistic measure
(ELF) since this region is not primarily fractionalised linguistically but mostly due to
ethnic groups.
Thus, our dataset is structured as a four-wave panel, which includes the time-invari-
ant ethnic fractionalisation variable and past immigration dummy. In our empirical
analysis we use the common methodology of SUR. This is for two particular reasons:
First of all, it allowed us to be comparable with existing findings such as Easterly
and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003). Second, and more important, a SUR
displays a clear advantage over a OLS regression, including fixed and random effect
panels, for this kind of growth regression analysis. In particular, this method allows for
country random effects to be correlated across decades and thus yields more efficient
5 Source: WDI 2003, this variable displays a very high correlation with the original variable telephone per
1,000 workers. See Appendix Table 12.
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estimators than the alternative methods mentioned above. In other words, the effects
of the independent variables on growth are allowed to be correlated within a country
specific framework over time, which is a clear advantage over standard OLS esti-
mates, fixed or random panel. Furthermore, SUR seems clearly more favourable since
it allows for a more detailed picture than a simple OLS where effects are averaged over a
30- or 40-year horizon. SUR, instead, assigns a regression to each of the four decades,
analysing the impact of a specific variable measured at the start of each decade on
growth whereby this impact may be specified to differ between the decades or not.
Moreover, like OLS, SUR allows for a time-invariant correlation between the inde-
pendent variable and growth, but the estimates are derived by incorporating decade
specific correlations.







β j t X ji t +
N∑
j=1
β j t Z ji + uit (2)
Hence, growth is a function of a decade-specific intercept alpha, a vector of vari-
ables X which vary across time t and countries i, a vector of variables Z which vary
only across countries plus an error term.
The second aim of this paper was to combine the two existing strands of literature
concerning the possibly counteracting impact of ethnic diversity on economic perfor-
mance. Thus, we needed to define what constitutes an immigration country in order
to single out the alleged positive impact of ethnic diversity due to immigration. There
are many possible definitions of the variable “immigration country”. However, we are
interested in countries which are ethnically heterogeneous according to our measure
and this to a large part due to migration. A country like Argentina, for example, has
a population consisting up to 97% of Spanish and Italian descendants. Our definition
therefore classifies a country as an immigration country if it was characterised by
settlement from a non-neighboring country, forced or free, within the past 300 years
and if the descendants of foreign settlers constitute a significant part (at least 5%)
of the population today. This variable is unsuspicious in regard to endogeneity. Data
are taken from the CIA World Factbook, where the group share of ethnic groups and
there origins are listed. Table 11 in the Appendix lists the countries included in this
definition.6
To get a first idea, the methodology we used to test for different effects of ethnic
diversity in immigration and non-immigration countries is a simple interaction term
between the immigration Dummy and the variable “ethnic”. The hypothesis being that,
if a country is classified as an immigration country with a long history of immigration,
we would expect a distinct positive or at least compensating impact of ethnic diversity
on growth. We analyse the underlying mechanism of the distinct positive effect of the
interaction term using SUR also.
6 However, we cannot prove whether co-ethnic networks exist in each of these countries.
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5 Results
5.1 Extending the data set
Before we start to analyse whether ethnic diversity has a distinct effect on growth
in immigration countries, we want to confirm and update the baseline analysis by
including the 1990s. The results are noteworthy by themselves as they lend support
to the original argument, namely, that high ethnic fractionalisation not only leads to
an adverse policy environment, but also shows some differences. Table 2 shows the
results of the updated data analysis. The first two columns in Table 2 reproduce the
original findings of Alesina et al. with the difference that the variable “log telephones
per worker” has been replaced by “log telephones per people” in regression (2).7
The adverse impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth via the policy environ-
ment is shown when comparing regressions (1) and (2) of Table 2, as the inclusion of
variables measuring the quality of the policy environment and public good provision
renders the negative impact of “ethnic” to insignificance and strongly reduces the size
of the coefficient.
If we now include data up to 1999, the following changes can be observed: First of
all, if we concentrate on specification (3), it confirms and strengthens the original find-
ings that ethnic fractionalisation has a negative impact on growth as the results remain
almost unchanged in terms of magnitude and significance. However, the coefficient of
the Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa gains in magnitude and significance. This hints at
the continuing diverging growth experience of this region, and the problem observed
first by Easterly and Levine that the model cannot fully explain this diverging growth
trend even though high ethnic diversity is one of the main characteristics of this region.
The significance and magnitude of the coefficients do not show much variation.
It is interesting that schooling becomes insignificant once we include telephone per
thousand people. One possible explanation is that physical and human capital infra-
structure is highly correlated for all decades. In the 1960s the correlation coefficient
between the level of schooling and telephones per thousand people takes a value of
0.83; for the 1990s it has increased to 0.89.8
However, the most important finding is, once we include data for the 1990s, that we
find a remaining effect of ethnic fractionalisation on growth, even after the inclusion
of the policy variables. The effect of ethnic fractionalisation remains significant at the
1% level in the 1990s if we do not restrict the coefficient to be the same across decades.
This can be seen in regression (1) in Table 3. The effect of ethnic fractionalisation on
growth in the 1990s is not mitigated by the inclusion of the policy variables.
7 To see the changes due to inclusion of this different variable in comparison with the original Alesina et al.
results, see Appendix Table 12.
8 Pritchett (1999) analyses why education has no significant influence on growth in a cross-country setting
and suggests three different explanations. First of all, it might be the case that indeed schooling creates no
human capital. Second, the marginal returns to human capital are falling rapidly where demand for educated
labour is stagnant. Last, the institutional environments in many countries have been sufficiently perverse












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3 1990s Effect
Source: Own calculations
t-stats in parentheses *0.1,
**0.05, ***0.01 Significance
level
Variable Growth rate 1960–1999
Dummy for the 1960s −0.077 (−0.97)
Dummy for the 1970s −0.070 (−0.89)
Dummy for the 1980s −0.088 (−1.12)
Dummy for the 1990s −0.079 (−1.01)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa −0.014∗∗∗ (−3.20)
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean −0.014∗∗∗ (−4.24)
Log of initial income 0.041** (2.14)
Log of initial income squared −0.004∗∗∗ (−3.30)
Log of schooling 0.004 (0.83)
Assassinations −2.204∗∗∗ (−2.51)
Financial depth 0.012*** (2.48)
Black market premium −0.016∗∗∗ (−4.23)
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.117*** (4.21)
Log of telephones per people 0.020*** (3.69)
Ethnic 1960 0.001 (0.12)
Ethnic 1970 −0.007 (−0.78)
Ethnic 1980 −0.005 (−0.60)
Ethnic 1990 −0.023∗∗∗ (−2.55)
No. Obs. 38;67;74;78
Adj R2 0.11;0.36;0.47;0.18
It seems likely that ethnic diversity has gained a bigger impact on growth in the
1990s.9 To further validate the finding, we ran a separate regression for each decade
to assess whether the impact of “ethnic” increased between the 1960s and the 1990s.
The results indicate that this is indeed the case as the only decade in which “ethnic”
has a negative significant impact, even after the inclusion of the policy variables, is
the 1990s. For all other decades, the impact of “ethnic” in the extended regression is
not statistically different from zero. The findings are shown in Table 4.
Moreover, we ran a completely unrestricted version of our SUR model, which
means that we loosened the restriction that coefficients have to be the same across
decades for all variables except the decade dummies. The results are shown in Table 9
in the Appendix. According to the adjusted R-squared, this model can explain growth
variations the best. The regression clearly shows that policy variables have very dis-
tinct effects in different decades, that conditional β-convergence can only be found in
two decades, and that ethnic fractionalisation has a sizeable impact on growth in the
1990s besides the policy variables. Therefore, we may well conclude that the model
9 It is, however, important to highlight that the sample size varies strongly between the decades. Only 38
observations are included for the decade of the 1960s. The result shows therefore that the significance of
ethnic fractionalisation seems to be dependent on the inclusion of certain countries. Furthermore, it could
be the case that a sample selection bias is introduced in the earlier decades because countries that cannot
manage ethnic diversity adequately were omitted.
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proposed by Alesina et al. (2003) cannot account for all the growth variation due to
ethnic fractionalisation, even after the inclusion of policy variables.
We tested several other models to explain the negative impact of ethnic
fractionalisation on growth in the 1990s and found that good governance mitigates
the influence of fractionalisation on growth as the inclusion of the Kaufman–Kraay–
Zoido-Lobaton-indicator in our regression renders the variable “ethnic” insignificant
(see Table 10 in the Appendix).10 Ethnic fractionalisation may lead to inefficient “iden-
tity” politics instead of efficient “performance” politics (Collier 1998). The index
measures governance in the dimensions graft, rule of law, voice and accountability,
political instability and violence, government effectiveness, and regulatory burden.
Governance seems to have gained importance for growth in the 1990s. This may
partly be explained by the withdrawal of influence by the two superpowers from many
regions of the world with the end of the Cold War. This increased importance of
governance on growth is confirmed in Table 10 in the Appendix which shows that
governance, as measured by KKZ, has only a significant influence on growth in the
1990s. Moreover, if we combine this results with Table 14 in the Appendix we see that
high fractionalisation has a significant negative effect on good governance and thus
an indirect effect on growth in the 1990s.
Furthermore, if the impact of ethnic fractionalisation is differing in the four decades,
it might also differ between regions. The sample is, therefore, divided into two sub-
groups. As we do not have sufficient numbers of observations to analyse the model
for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America separately, we combined both to one group
including 85 countries. We compare this with “the rest of the world” including 75
OECD, Asian and some Arabic countries. The results are shown in Table 5. Strikingly,
the results differ very much between the two subgroups. Considering Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America, the impact of the variable measuring ethnic fractionali-
sation, however, remains significant only at the 10% level after the inclusion of the
policy variables.
Contrarily, in the “rest of the world” the hypothesis of Alesina et al. and Easterly
and Levine seems to explain the growth differences between countries rather well.
Inefficient policies and low public good provision explain the diverging growth trends
due to ethnic fractionalisation. In these regions it seems to be indeed the case that
the transmission channel of high ethnic fractionalisation and its negative impact on
growth can be explained by an adverse policy environment alone. Thus, the obtained
results show that the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth above and
beyond the policy control variables prevails only in the 1990s and in the regions of
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.
The above approach, however, faces the problem that few observations remain
when restricting the sample to Sub-Saharan and Latin-American countries. In order
to verify the findings we included an interaction term for ethnic fractionalisation in
Sub-Saharan Africa. The results clearly show that the remaining negative impact of
ethnic fractionalisation on economic growth is captured in the last interaction term for
10 Many observations are lost when including the governance index. We, therefore, ran the model without
the governance variable for the same numbers of observation. Nothing changes. Ethnic fractionalisation
remains significant in explaining growth.
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Table 5 Sub-Saharan African and Latin American results
Variable Dependent variable: growth rate 1960–1999
Africa and Latinam Rest of the World
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for the
1960s
0.127 (1.2) −0.037 (−0.30) −0.249∗∗∗ (−2.58) 0.006 (0.05)
Dummy for the
1970s
0.125 (1.17) −0.033 (−0.27) −0.249∗∗∗ (−2.58) 0.008 (0.06)
Dummy for the
1980s
0.099 (0.93) −0.053 (−0.43) −0.262∗∗∗ (−2.72) −0.005 (−0.04)
Dummy for the
1990s
0.12 (1.03) −0.054 (−0.44) −0.256∗∗∗ (−2.68) 0.004 (0.03)
Log of initial
income
−0.026 (−0.93) 0.03 (0.94) 0.076*** (3.21) 0.026 (0.86)
Log of initial
income squared
0.002 (0.81) −0.003 (−1.50) −0.005∗∗∗ (−3.63) −0.004∗∗ (−2.06)
Log of schooling 0.011** (1.98) −0.004 (0.54) 0.011** (2.25) 0.008 (1.54)
Assassinations −24.819∗∗∗ (−2.57) −16.353 (−0.76)
Financial depth 0.036*** (2.33) 0.01* (1.84)
Black market
premium
−0.015∗∗∗ (−2.82) −0.018∗∗∗ (−2.87)
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.113*** (2.84) 0.083* (1.95)
Log of telephones
per people
0.022*** (2.48) 0.026*** (3.26)
Ethnic −0.014∗ (−1.81) −0.016∗ (−1.77) −0.019∗∗∗ (−2.52) −0.001 (−0.063)
No. Obs. 181 105 175 114
Adj R2 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.39
Source: Own calculations
t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level
ethnic fractionalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa in the regression presented in Table 6.11
The variable “ethnic” which captures the residual effect of ethnic fractionalisation in
general, is no longer statistically significant. The overall effect of the interaction term
is on average −0.032,12 which implies that the inclusion of the policy variables did
not change the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth for Sub-Saharan
African countries. These results confirm the hypothesis that the remaining negative
impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth, even after the inclusion of policy vari-
ables, is in particular a Sub-Saharan phenomenon.
11 We also tested for a Latin American*Ethnic interaction term; however, there was no specific Latin
American impact.
12 Which is the coefficient of the interaction term multiplied by the average ethnic fractionalisation in SSA
(−0.049*0.658). However, this effect should be possibly interpreted jointly with the SSA effect, which
is now positive, but is just below the 10% significance level (p-value = 0.1079). Then the overall effect
becomes −0.017 of ethnic fragmentation in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also generally interesting to note that
the SSA dummy is almost statistically significantly positive which would imply a stronger than average
growth in SSA once the effect of ethnic fractionalisation is accounted for.
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Table 6 1990s and SSA effect
Variable Growth rate 1960–1999
Dummy for the 1960s 0.029 (0.38)
Dummy for the 1970s 0.032 (0.41)
Dummy for the 1980s 0.015 (0.19)
Dummy for the 1990s 0.017 (0.23)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa 0.015 (1.61)
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean −0.014∗∗∗ (−4.39)
Log of initial income 0.015 (0.80)
Log of initial income squared −0.002∗∗ (−2.04)
Log of schooling 0.003 (0.64)
Assassinations −21.526∗∗ (−2.48)
Financial depth 0.011** (2.31)
Black market premium −0.016∗∗∗ (−4.30)
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.105*** (3.85)






t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level
Given the above results, we wanted to test the hypothesis that violent civil
conflicts could explain this decade- and region-specific effect of ethnic fractionalisa-
tion as existing research found already robust evidence that ethnic polarisation explains
civil conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).13 This hypothesis is conceivable
as conflict incidences increased substantially between the 1960s and the 1990s and are
concentrated in particular in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, as
confirmed by the Prio Database of the International Peace Research Institute Oslo.14
However, our empirical results cannot support the hypothesis above because the influ-
ence of the violent conflict variables on growth is not significantly different from
13 Even though civil conflict is better explained by ethnic polarisation than by ethnic fractionalisation,
those two concepts are sufficiently correlated to control empirically if the inclusion of a violent conflict
variables renders the impact of the ethnic fractionalisation variable above and beyond the inclusion of the
policy variables on growth to insignificance.
14 Prio Database of the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, www.prio.no. The database reports the
crude measure of numbers of conflicts as follows: 82 incidences of violent conflict beginning in the 1960s
(34 of which took place in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America), 87 in the1970s (33 of which took place
in SSA and LA), 102 in the 1980s (30 of which took place in SSA and LA), jumping to 172 incidences
at the beginning of the 1990s in the whole world (77 of which took place in SSA and LA). Even though
this measure holds no information concerning the intensity and duration of violent conflict, it confirms the
sheer fact that the incidences of civil conflict has increased dramatically in the 1990s and that they were
mostly concentrated in Sub-Saharan and Latin America.
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Table 7 SSA effect including investment and the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton-index
Variable Growth rate 1960–1999
Dummy for the 1960s −0.055 (−0.83) −0.124∗ (−0.17)
Dummy for the 1970s −0.057 (−0.86) −0.124∗ (−1.67)
Dummy for the 1980s −0.077 (−1.16) −0.140∗ (−1.88)
Dummy for the 1990s −0.070 (−1.05) −0.126∗ (−1.71)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa 0.007 (0.81) −0.004 (−0.28)
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean −0.015∗∗∗ (−4.72) −0.016∗∗∗ (−4.93)
Log of initial income 0.026 (1.53) 0.048∗∗∗ (2.58)
Log of initial income squared −0.002∗∗ (−1.84) −0.004∗∗∗ (−3.15)
Log of schooling 0.011*** (2.96) 0.004 (0.85)
Kaufmann. Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton-index 0.012*** (4.08)
Ethnic −0.012∗ (−1.83) 0.004 (0.67)
Ethnic×SSA −0.029∗∗ (−2.26) −0.027 (−1.31)
No. Obs. 356 282
Adj R2 0.36 0.40
Source: Own calculations
t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level
zero, and the variable “ethnic” does not lose significance.15 Thus, at least the variable
specifications we used for violent civil conflicts cannot explain the remaining sizable
negative effect of the ethnic fractionalisation variable on growth after the inclusion of
policy variables in the 1990s or for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.
Again the effect of ethnic fractionalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa is mitigated by
the inclusion of governance in the restricted SUR model. The results are shown in
Table 7 below.
To sum up, we find a remaining direct negative effect of fractionalisation on growth
in the 1990s and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The specific 1990s and Sub-Saharan Africa
effect of fractionalisation can be explained by bad governance and the consequential
growth hampering effect.
5.2 Migration and ethnic fractionalisation
The second aim of this paper is to reconcile the two theoretical arguments of the
different effects of ethnic fractionalisation and immigration on growth presented in
the first part of this paper. So far we have argued empirically that fractionalisation of
groups is problematic as it leads to conflicts of political nature, hampering growth.
Now, we hypothesise that countries in which ethnic fractionalisation partially emerged
because of immigration should also experience positive effects due to diversity and not
15 The results are not reported here. Data are from the Prio Database. Multiple definitions of violent civil
conflicts were tested: minor-, intermediate civil conflict, civil war (internal and internationalised internal)
and frequency in a decade. None of this specifications produced significant results.
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only negative effects. We do not argue that in immigration countries, models which
explain inefficient policies and low public good provision due to ethnic fractionali-
sation are no longer valid. We rather investigate whether positive effects of diversity
also prevail in countries with long-settled immigrants and which effect dominates in a
cross-country setting. Before turning to our empirical analysis of this issue, we would
like to highlight some of our constraints in testing the hypothesis. First of all, to draw
a clear definition of what constitutes an “immigration country”, is less straightforward
for our purpose. Second, the theory of co-ethnic networks is only tested superficially
in our setting. Usually, the theory on co-ethnic networks is tested by analysing the
relationship between the inflow of migrants and trade using panel data. Ethnic frac-
tionalisation is assumed to be time-invariable.16 The networks we look at have been
in existence since a long time.
Utilising the new dataset, we tested whether there is a distinguished effect of ethnic
fractionalisation on economic performance in countries which are ethnically diverse
partly due to foreign settlement or migration. The argument being that those coun-
tries which display high ethnic diversity, partly due to foreign settlement or migration,
might be capable to reap the benefits of such an increased diversity via increased trade.
Our results indicate that our hypothesis is validated to some extent (see Table 8).
Countries created by foreign settlement or with high levels of immigration17 seem
to exhibit positive effects of ethnic fractionalisation on subsequent growth. The coef-
ficient of the interaction-term implies that the negative effect of ethnic diversity on
long-run growth is more than mitigated. In fact, there is small positive net-effect in
immigration countries, again even if the policy variables which measure the quality
of governmental policy are taken into account. The hypothesised channel of the co-
ethnic trading network theory would ascribe the remaining positive effect on growth
to trade.18 However, we cannot confirm these trade channels, as we find no evidence
of a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and trade in our immigration coun-
tries. Ethnic diversity in immigration countries is no significant determinant of foreign
direct investments or exports.19
Thus, the remaining reason for the positive net effect of ethnic fractionalisation on
growth in immigration countries is not entirely clear. However, we would hypothesise
that the different positive effect of ethnic fractionalisation on growth does not solely
operate over positive co-ethnic trading network in immigration countries, which might
16 However, any country that experienced massive waves of immigration would have seen significant
changes in fractionalisation. The construction of a time-variable measure of fractionalisation is behind the
scope of this paper.
17 Our definition is that a country is classified as an immigration country if it was either created by set-
tlement from abroad, forced or free, within the past 300 years and the descendants of foreign settlers or
immigrants of non-neighbouring countries constitute more than 5% of the population today.
18 Trade is defined as exports and imports as a share of GDP, which increased dramatically between the
1960s and 1990s in most countries and also displayed an increased variation between countries. However,
both patterns of change cannot be explained by our time-invariant variable ’ethnic fractionalisation’ which
is assumed to be constant over the 40-year horizon. However, we would like to point out that a change in
the ethnic index would require substantive migration flows and thus even if a time-variant variable “ethnic”
would be generated, we would expect it to be characterised by none or little and very slowly change over
time and thus would be most likely no suitable variable to explain rapid change in trade patterns.
19 Results are not reported here, but are available on request.
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Table 8 Past settlement, immigration, ethnic fractionalisation and growth
Variable Dependent variable: growth rate 1960–1999
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy for the 1960s −0.042 (0.60) −0.042 (0.59) 0.015 (0.18)
Dummy for the 1970s −0.045 (0.63) −0.044 (0.61) 0.019 (0.22)
Dummy for the 1980s −0.066 (−0.92) −0.065 (−0.90) 0.001 (0.01)
Dummy for the 1990s −0.060 (0.83) −0.059 (0.81) 0.002 (0.02)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa 0.000 (0.04) −0.001 (0.29) −0.004 (0.76)
Log of initial income 0.036** (2.01) 0.036** (1.99) 0.027** (1.29)
Log of initial income squared −0.003∗∗ (2.44) −0.003∗∗ (2.43) −0.003 (2.31)
Dependency ratio −0.047∗∗∗ (3.93) −0.043∗∗∗ (3.58) −0.034∗∗∗ (2.63)
Log of schooling 0.007* (1.75) 0.007 (1.61) 0.000 (0.047)
Assassinations −27.375∗∗(2.48) −21.426∗∗(2.13)
Financial depth 0.016*** (2.90)
Black market premium −0.018∗∗∗ (4.29)
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.119*** (3.81)
Log of telephones per people 0.015** (2.41)
Ethnic −0.029∗∗∗ (3.64) −0.030∗∗∗ (3.79) −0.019∗∗ (2.18)
Immigration dummy −0.019∗∗∗ (3.39) −0.017∗∗∗ (3.11) −0.014∗∗ (2.36)
Immigration*ethnic 0.034*** (2.71) 0.034*** (2.76) 0.027** (2.03)
No. Obs. 356 349 257
Adj R2 0.36 0.37 0.50
Source: Own calculations
t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level. Note also that the Latinam dummy is left
out because it is highly correlated with the immigration dummy
have been in existence for quite some time. In fact, we would hypothesise that the
positive effect is also partially due to the fundamentally different setup of institu-
tions in immigration countries and the willingness of most immigrants to productively
engage and at least partly assimilate in their new home country. There is tentative
evidence for such a hypothesis as the immigration country dummy shows a different,
in fact positive significant correlation, with the quality of policy.20
To conclude this section, we find clear evidence that ethnic diversity in “immigra-
tion countries” has a positive growth enhancing effect, which counteracts the measured
negative effect of ethnic fractionalisation. Thus, the net effect of ethnic fractionali-
sation in immigration countries on economic performance and growth is positive
and very different from the negative effect of multi-ethnic societies which might be
suffering from historically entrenched, possibly rival, ethnic fractionalisation due to
post-colonial border drawing.
20 This is also in line with the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2001). (The results are not reported here, but
would make for a interesting further paper.)
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6 Conclusion and future research questions
In the end, it seems clear that the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth
remains significant and robust for Sub-Saharan Africa if we include the 1990s in
our empirical analysis following the Alesina et al. model. Interestingly, the transmis-
sion channels which explained how ethnic fractionalisation negatively affects growth,
namely via the policy variables specified, is less prominent in the extended analysis,
as ethnic fractionalisation remains a significant negative explanatory power in the
growth regression for Sub-Saharan African countries even after the inclusion of the
policy variables. Thus, the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on economic
growth cannot fully be explained and there might be some other transmission chan-
nels which link high ethnic fractionalisation to poor growth performance than the
ones investigated and specified so far. In particular, the different results of the dif-
ferent regions in the world suggest that Sub-Saharan Africa does not only face an
adverse policy environment, but also that high ethnic fractionalisation remains an
obstacle to growth, especially in the 1990s. We tried two different channels to explain
this increased negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth in the Sub-Saharan
African setting of the 1990s, namely, a increased role of good governance as measured
by the KKZ indicator and an increased number of violent conflicts. We managed to
show that this increased negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation in the 1990s in
Sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by the KKZ index which is a different measure
of governance quality and confirms the hypothesis of growing importance of sound
governance to facilitate growth. However, we could not confirm the hypothesis that an
increasing number of incidences and severity of violent civil conflicts could explain
the remaining negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation above and beyond the policy
control variables.
Moreover, as already mentioned above, there might be a further conceivable trans-
mission channel of high ethnic fractionalisation on growth, namely income inequality
and especially segregation. Especially, if one considers a longer time horizon, very
high income inequality, which might be a result of high ethnic fractionalisation and
segregation in connection with badly designed institutions, might lead to a reduction in
growth via the suboptimal provision and accumulation of factors of production, such
as physical and human capital. This explanation gains validity especially in countries
with imperfect markets. A further inquiry into this matter seems very much worth-
while, but rather difficult to facilitate due to the limitation of useable data sources.
Concerning migration, ethnic fractionalisation and growth, this paper suggests that
there is a mitigating positive impact in countries which are characterised as settler
or immigration countries. This gives some empirical validation to the co-ethnic net-
work theory in a cross-country setting. Promising future research in this field should
focus on the network enhancing trade effect of immigration in a country cross-section
framework, in order to strengthen the argument above and confirm the case studies‘
findings on co-ethnic network theory in a wider setting. Moreover, it might be the case
that the positive impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth in immigration countries
might be also partially due to due to the fundamentally different setup of institutions in
immigration countries and the willingness of most immigrants to productively engage
and at least partly assimilate in their new home country.
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In conclusion, this paper confirms and strengthens the initial assessment that ethnic
fractionalisation is one of the key proxies for a negative policy environment and sub-
sequent poor growth performance. However, it also illustrates that our understanding
of the impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth is far from complete: other dimen-
sions and transmission channels of ethnic fractionalisation on growth, in
particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, seem to be present, namely, bad governance. More-
over, in settler or immigration countries ethnic fractionalisation is not necessarily a
“problem”, but possibly a growth-enhancing situation via co-ethnic trade networks.
Furthermore, we put emphasis on the findings by Easterly (2001a,b) which show that
democratic institutions and low inequality can resolve ethnic conflict in the political
sphere. Thus, countries with high ethnic fractionalisation and a strong income-divide
between groups face the danger, but not necessarily the consequences of growth retar-
dation. Hence, the challenge ahead, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, is the full
participation of all ethnic groups in the economic development process and the blur-
ring of ethnic ties, which might be a way to overcome this serious obstacle in many
developing countries.
Appendix
See Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.
Table 9 Unrestricted SUR
model Variable Dependent variable:growth rate 1960–1999
Coefficient t-Statistic
Dummy for the 1960s −0.267 −1.15
Dummy for the 1970s −0.396∗∗ −2.14∗∗
Dummy for the 1980s −0.167 −1.45
Dummy for the 1990s 0.103 −0.65
1960s
Africa −0.019∗∗ −1.94∗∗
Latin America −0.024∗ −3.68∗
Log of initial income 0.091 1.54
Log of initial income squared −0.007 −1.83
Log of schooling 0.013 1.50
Assassinations 46.595 0.94
Financial depth 0.0001 0.01
Black market premium −0.0187 −1.34
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.084 0.78
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Latin America −0.014∗∗ −2.23∗∗
Log of initial income 0.138∗ 2.92∗
Log of initial income squared −0.011∗ −3.65∗
Log of schooling 0.002 0.34
Assassinations −22.564 −1.52
Financial depth 0.009 0.92
Black market premium −0.028∗ −3.06∗
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.197∗ 3.19∗






Latin America −0.019∗ −3.76∗
Log of initial income 0.061∗∗ 2.09∗∗
Log of initial income squared −0.005∗ −2.75∗
Log of schooling 0.004 0.61
Assassinations −21.280∗∗ −2.19∗∗
Financial depth 0.016∗∗ 2.02∗∗
Black market premium −0.009∗∗∗ −1.82∗∗∗
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.121∗ 3.46∗






Latin America −0.008 −1.34
Log of initial income −0.005 −0.13
Log of initial income squared −0.001 −0.42
Log of schooling 0.005 0.58
Assassinations −72.156∗∗ −1.99∗∗
Financial depth 0.008 0.94
Black market premium −0.020∗∗ −2.28∗∗















Table 10 Unrestricted SUR
model including Kaufmann,




Dummy for the 1960s −0.325 −1.44
Dummy for the 1970s −0.437∗∗ −2.45∗∗
Dummy for the 1980s −0.277∗∗ −2.37∗∗
Dummy for the 1990s 0.135 −0.71
1960s
Africa −0.018∗∗∗ −1.88∗∗∗
Latin America −0.015∗∗ −2.17∗∗
Log of initial income 0.116∗∗ 2.01∗∗
Log of initial income squared −0.010∗ −2.59∗
Log of schooling 0.011 1.40
Assassinations 56.408 1.27
Financial depth 0.026∗∗ 2.13∗∗
Black market premium −0.016 −0.92
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.009 0.08
Log of telephones per people 0.021∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗
Ethnic 0.006 0.58






Latin America −0.016∗ −2.81∗
Log of initial income 0.143∗ 3.14∗
Log of initial income squared −0.011∗ −3.73∗
Log of schooling 0.004 0.61
Assassinations −18.421 −1.46
Financial depth 0.003 0.31
Black market premium −0.035∗ −3.95∗
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Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.174∗ 3.04∗
Log of telephones per people 0.031∗ 3.67∗
Ethnic 0.009 0.84






Latin America −0.028∗ −5.30∗
Log of initial income 0.088∗ 2.94∗
Log of initial income squared −0.006∗ −3.32∗
Log of schooling −0.004 −0.51
Assassinations −19.084∗∗ −2.32∗∗
Financial depth 0.007 1.013
Black market premium −0.008∗∗∗ −1.68∗∗∗
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.099∗ 2.90∗
Log of telephones per people 0.017∗∗ 2.02∗∗
Ethnic −0.008 −0.84






Latin America −0.010 −1.34
Log of initial income 0.054 1.18
Log of initial income squared −0.004∗∗∗ −1.68∗∗∗
Log of schooling 0.013 1.24
Assassinations −52.058 −1.42
Financial depth 0.002 0.28
Black market premium −0.018 −1.34
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.120∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗
Log of telephones per people 0.004 0.30
Ethnic −0.016 −1.40
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Table 12 Comparison Alesina et al. with our results
Variable Dependent variable: growth rate 1960–1989
1 2
Dummy for the 1960s −0.233∗∗∗ (−2.34) −0.166∗ (−1.73)
Dummy for the 1970s −0.227∗∗∗ (−2.28) −0.163∗ (−1.70)
Dummy for the 1980s −0.243∗∗∗ (−2.45) −0.179∗ (−1.88)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa −0.017∗∗∗ (−3.11) −0.013∗∗∗ (−2.75)
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean −0.015∗∗∗ (−4.14) −0.017∗∗∗ (−4.46)
Log of initial income 0.081*** (3.23) 0.067*** (2.76)
Log of initial income squared −0.007∗∗∗ (−3.98) −0.006∗∗∗ (−3.66)
Log of schooling 0.009∗ (1.85) 0.005 (0.96)
Assassinations −23.705∗∗∗ (−2.58) −17.985∗ (−1.95)
Financial depth 0.013** (2.12) 0.011** (1.99)
Black market premium −0.018∗∗∗ (−4.10) −0.015∗∗∗ (−3.45)
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.165*** (4.45) 0.11*** (3.64)
Log of telephones per worker 0.006*** (2.41)
Log of telephones per people 0.022*** (3.64)
Ethnic −0.005 (−0.75) −0.004 (−0.54)
No. Obs. 175 179
Adj R2 0.56 0.57
Source: Own calculations
t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level
Table 13 Balanced panel robustness check
Variable Dependent variable: growth rate 1960–1989
1 2 3 4
Dummy for the 1960s −0.207 (0.079)∗∗∗ −0.212 (0.078)∗∗∗ −0.142 (0.074)∗ −0.066 (0.075)
Dummy for the 1970s −0.205 (0.079)∗∗∗ −0.209 (0.078)∗∗∗ −0.137 (0.074)∗ −0.063 (0.075)
Dummy for the 1980s −0.225 (0.079)∗∗∗ −0.229 (0.078)∗∗∗ −0.154 (0.074)∗∗ −0.080 (0.075)












Variable Dependent variable: growth rate 1960–1989
1 2 3 4
Log of initial income 0.063 (0.020)*** 0.065 (0.020)*** 0.051 (0.018)*** 0.038 (0.018)**
Log of initial
income squared
−0.004 (0.001)∗∗∗ −0.004 (0.001)∗∗∗ −0.004 (0.001)∗∗∗ −0.004 (0.001)∗∗∗
Log of schooling 0.010 (0.004)** 0.009 (0.004)** 0.010 (0.004)** 0.003 (0.004)
Assassinations −24.813 (9.871)∗∗ −17.867 (8.968)∗∗ −17.254 (8.751)∗∗
Financial depth 0.017 (0.005)*** 0.013 (0.005)***
Black market premium −0.019 (0.004)∗∗∗ −0.017 (0.004)∗∗∗




Ethnic −0.018 (0.006)∗∗∗ −0.018 (0.006)∗∗∗ −0.013 (0.005)∗∗ −0.009 (0.005)
No. Obs. 257 257 257 257
Adj R2 0.60 0.61 0.69 0.70
Source: Own calculations
p-value in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level
Table 14 Indirect effect of
fractionalisation on good
governance
Variable Dependent variable: KKZ-index
Coefficient t-Statistic
Dummy for the 1960s −1.153∗∗∗ −3.60
Dummy for the 1970s −1.292∗∗∗ −3.95
Dummy for the 1980s −1.467∗∗∗ −4.44
Dummy for the 1990s −1.673∗∗∗ −4.89
Africa 0.147 1.18
Latin America −0.323∗∗∗ −3.34
Log of initial income 0.242 ∗ ∗∗ 6.70
Log of schooling 0.279 ∗ ∗∗ 4.19
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